Abstract
Introduction
Pseudo-random sequences are commonly used in cryptology. It can be implemented as either key stream generators in stream cipher systems or pseudo-random number generators in session key generators. Pseudo-random sequence generators (PRSG) based on linear feedback shift registers (LFSR) are most common structures in practice due to their efficient hardware implementation. There are two ways to construct LFSR based PRSGs. One way is to apply boolean functions to a set of ¢ LFSRs, the resulting sequences are called filtering function sequences if the LFSRs are equal or combinatorial function sequences if they are distinct (see [10] ). The other way is to use one LFSR to control outputs of another LFSR (may be the two LFSRs are the same) by using two different control models, One is the clock-control generators [1] [8] (stop/go or Gunther's generalized form [7] ), and the other is the shrinking generators [2] , including self-shrinking generators [9] . There are extensive researches on attacks on the clock-control generators and/or the shrinking generators, here we list some of them [3] [5] [12] [4] .
In this paper, we will present a new type of pseudorandom sequence generators, constructed by using two ternary LFSRs. The resulting generator is called an editing generator. This is a combined model of the clock-control generator (viewed as insertion) and the shrinking generator (viewed as deletion). The resulting sequences are ternary sequences. We will show that the editing generators have good properties of randomness. For example, they have large periods, high linear spans, large ratio of linear span per symbol, and small unbias of occurrences of symbols. Although these properties may not guarantee security of the editing generators for cryptographic applications, it is necessary to resist to the attacks from the application of the Berlekamp-Massey algorithm. Following satisfaction in these results on the new generator, we will look at its security under a randomized model. We will consider two different attacks for recovering the initial states of two LFSRs, given that a portion of a key stream is exposed. The first one is the parity-check attack in search of the initial states of two LFSRs. The complexity of this algorithm will serve as a benchmark in comparison with the other attack. The second attack is analogous to the attack to the clockcontrol generator proposed in [3] . Our analysis shows that the edited sequences resist to both of these attacks. This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we will introduce the construction of the editing generator and derive some basic properties. In Section 3, we will present the properties of randomness of the editing generator. The security of the editing generator under a randomized model will be discussed in section 4.
We conclude this section with some preliminaries on msequences over £ ¥ ¤ which will be used in this paper. For more results on m-sequences over non-binary fields, the reader is referred to [11] . 
A. Some Basic Concepts and Notations
. If the elements of satisfies the following linear recursive relation:
then is said to be an LFSR sequence generated by 
Construction
In this section, we will introduce the construction of the editing generator and derive some basic properties on randomness. First, we take a look at the operations of the stopand-go generator, a simple model of clock-control generators, and the shrinking generator.
Let
be two binary sequences generated by LFSR 1 and LFSR 2 respectively.
The Stop-and-Go generator
Output sequence:
where
and set
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In other words, at time
, the generator outputs the current output bit of LFSR 1. Otherwise, the generator outputs the previous output bit (inserting).
The Shrinking Generator:
, then the generator outputs the current bit ¥ j of . Otherwise this bit is discarded. I.e.,
The new generator, the editing generator, is to combine these two operations together, in order to resist to the known attacks to those two control models when they are used separately. This definition can be written into the following pseudocode:
Definition 1 Let
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Algorithm 1 (Edit(A, B)): Algorithm for Generating Edited Sequences

Input:
and h , two ternary LFSR sequences Output: an edited sequence k of length
Note. The initial value of
¥HE
can be taken as any value in £ ¤
. In this paper, we will use this initial setting throughout of this paper.
In the following, we will derive some basic properties of the edited sequences. From Algorithm t ' p ¦ 9 A % h I
, we know that the index , which gives the two formulae in (5). The rest of the formulae follows by applying a similar argument. Thus the first assertion is true. From (7), we have 
The Properties of Randomness
In this section, we will derive the least period of the edited sequence t ' p ¦ 9 A % h I
, a large lower bound for the linear span, ratio of linear span to period, and occurrences of symbols. We will keep the notation in Section 2. 
Period and Linear Span
Occurrences of Symbols
In the following theorem, we will establish a bound for frequency of each element in
£ ¤
occurs in an edited sequence. 
Theorem 3
, an edited sequence from the base sequence and the control sequence 
Security Analysis
In this section, we investigate the security of the edited sequence . In this section, we show that the initial state of (h resp.) can be determined, given that of h ( resp.). However, this does not mean this key stream generator is insecure since to find the initial state of (h resp.) needs a search space of 
Unconstraint Embedding Attack
In this subsection, we investigate the possibility to attack the editing generator via searching for the initial state of sequence x T his attack is a variant of the unconstraint embedding attack in [3] . According to the definition of the edited sequence, we can write 
